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JURISDICTION TO REVIEW WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL REGULATIONS:
CPC INTERNATIONAL INC. v. TRAIN
The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 19721
(FWPCA) were passed against a background of increasing national
concern over water pollution2 and the quality of the environment in
general. 3 FWPCA establishes a complex scheme4 designed to achieve its
stated "national goal that the discharge of pollutants . . .into the
navigable waters be eliminated by 1985." 5 To attain this goal, the new
amendments allow the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
regulate the amount of effluents emitted by any source.6 By broadening
the enforcement powers of the EPA, 7 Congress has sought to make
pollution the exception rather than the rule and place the burden of
justifying pollution on the polluter.8
I. FWPCA § 101-518, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (Supp. II, 1972).
2. See, e.g., the Water Pollution Control Act of 1948, Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L.
No. 845, ch. 758, 62 Stat. 1155. Federal water pollution legislation dates from the 1899
River and Harbors Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 407-14 (1970), but expanded rapidly after the Water
Pollution Control Act of 1948. The primary responsibility for enforcement is on the states,
only half of which had fully approved water quality standards by 1971. The federal
government has had little success in trying to coordinate and enforce those standards.
SENATE COMM. ON PUBLIC WORKS, A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE WATER POLLUTION
CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1972, 93d Cong., 1 st Sess. 1422-23, 1426 [hereinafter cited
as LEGISLATIVE HISTORY].
3. See. e.g., National Environmental Policy Act of 1969,42 U.S.C. §§4321-47 (1970),
as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (Supp. V, 1975); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1857-58a (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857b-1, 1857c-5, c-8 to -10, 1857d-1,
1857f-1, f-6e to -7, 1857h-5, 1857i (Supp. IV, 1974).
4. For a section-by-section analysis of the Act see F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRON-
MENTAL LAW § 3.03, at 3-80 to -176 (1973); R. Zener, The Federal Law of Water Pollution
Control, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 682-791 (1974).
5. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 (FWPCA) § 101(a)(l),
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
6. Id. §§ 301-07, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311-17.
7. The Water Quality Act of 1%5, Pub. L. No. 89-234,79 Stat. 903, provided only for
development and promulgation of water quality standards. For the history of prior water
pollution control legislation see F. GRAD, supra note 4, § 3.03; Barry, The Evolution of the
Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study of the
Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, 68 MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1970).
8. See FWPCA § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 131 1(a) (Supp. II, 1972). "The most noteworthy
aspect of the legislation. . . is what has been referred to as a 'clean water's' approach."
F. GRAD, supra note 4, § 3.03, at 3-81.
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An initial step in the statutory scheme guiding issuance of water
pollution control regulations by the EPA is the promulgation of effluent
limitation regulations. In CPC International Inc. v. Train,9 a group of
corn processing companies brought suit before the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit challenging guidelines and perform-
ance standards promulgated to cover the grain processing industry. 0
The principal issue before the court was whether it had jurisdiction to
review effluent limitation regulations for existing plants." The court
held that the EPA did not have the authority under FWPCA to promul-
gate such regulations and thus jurisdiction in the court of appeals was
improper. 12
Under section 301(b)13 of FWPCA existing sources of pollution must
be brought into compliance with the following standards and timetable.
By July 1, 1977, sources must meet effluent limitations achievable
through application of the "best practicable control technology cur-
rently available as defined by the Administrator pursuant to section
Section 301(c) of the FWPCA, 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(c) (Supp.. II, 1972), allows the Agency
Administrator to modify effluent limitations only "upon a showing by the owner or
operator of such point source ... that such modified requirements (!) will represent the
maximum use of technology within the economic capability of the owner or operator; and(2) will result in reasonable further progress toward elimination of the discharge of
pollutants."
9. 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975).
10. Id. at 1034.
Ii. Id. The court also considered challenges to regulations covering standards of
performance for new plants (§ 306(b)) and pretreatment standards for new plants which
discharge wastes into publicly-owned treatment plants (§ 307(c)). Id. The court held that
these regulations were not adequately supported by EPA findings. Employing the stand-
ards for a limited scope of judicial review established in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park
v. Volpe. 401 U.S. 402 (1971), the court held that § 306(d) regulations were not formulated
in terms of "the best available demonstrated control technology" as required by §
306(a)(1). 515 F.2d at 1050. EPA had contended that simultaneous use of all technology
presently available in the industry (but not all used in one plant), in addition to deep bed
filtration, would allow new plants to meet the standards. The court held, however, that the
technology was not demonstrated to be available within the industry and that EPA findings
were inadequate to justify their assessment that deep bed filtration could be applied to this
industry and handle the unique "shockload" problems in processing corn. The court
remanded the regulations for Agency action within 120 days, with the additional directive
to consider technology costs as required by the Act. Id. at 1047-50.
The § 307(c) regulations covering pretreatment standards for new plants that emit
wastes into a municipal system were held too vague to provide adequate notice to plant
operators of potential violations. The regulations were remanded for a more precise
Agency definition of what constituted an "excessive" discharge that would produce a
"treatment process upset and subsequent loss of treatment efficacy." Id. at 1052.
12. Id. at 1037.
13. FWPCA § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. 11, 1972).
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[304(b)]. . . ." By July 1, 1983, limitations achievable through applica-
tion of the "best available technology economically achievable. . . as
determined in accordance with regulations issued by the Administrator
pursuant to section [304(b)]. . "must be met. Section 304(b) 14 requires
the EPA to promulgate guidelines to aid adoption or revision of effluent
limitations. Although section 509(b) provides for review of selected
EPA actions in a circuit court of appeals, including "approving or
promulgating any effluent limitation. . . under section [301] .
no provision is made for review of section 304(b) guidelines.' 6
Prior to CPC two federal district courts had considered whether
original jurisdiction for review of EPA promulgated guidelines and
effluent limitations is in the district or circuit courts. In American Paper
Institute i. Train,7 a district court denied jurisdiction declaring that the
promulgation of guidelines is not reviewable and establishment of
effluent limitations is reviewable only in the court of appeals. 18 E.L
14. FWPCA § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. It, 1972), provides in pertinent part:
For the purpose of adopting or revising effluent limitations under this chapter the
Administrator shall . . . publish within one year of October 18, 1972, regulations,
providing guidelines for effluent limitations. . . . Such regulations shall-(I )(A) identify. . . the degree of effluent reduction attainable through the applica-
tion of the best practicable control technology currently available . . .; and(B) specify factors to be taken into account in determining the control measures
and practices to be applicable to point sources. . . . Factors relating to the assess-
ment of best practicable control technology currently available to comply with
subsection (b)(1) of section 1311 of this title shall include consideration of the total
cost of application of technology in relation to the effluent reduction benefits to be
achieved from such application . . . and such other factors as the Administrator
deems appropriate ...
15. FWPCA § 509(b). 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp. It, 1972).
16. (I) Review of the Administrator's action (A) in promulgating any standard of
performance under section 1316 of this title, (B) in making any determination
pursuant to section 1316(b)(!)(C) of this title, (C) in promulgating any effluent
standard, prohibition, or treatment standard under section 1317 of this title, (D) in
making any determination as to a State permit program submitted under section
1342(b) of this title, (E) in approving or promulgating any effluent limitation or other
limitation under section 1311, 1312, or 1316 of this title, and (F) in issuing or denying
any permit under section 1342 of this title, may be had by any interested person in the
Circuit Court of Appeals of the United States for the Federal judicial district in which
such person resides or transacts such business upon application by such person. Any
such application shall be made within ninety days from the date of such determina-
tion, approval, promulgation, issuance or denial, or after such date only if such
application is based solely on grounds which arose after such ninetieth day.(2) Action of the Administrator with respect to which review could have been
obtained under paragraph (I) of this subsection shall not be subject to judicial review
in any civil or criminal proceeding for enforcement.
FWPCA § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp. II, 1972) (emphasis added). Note that in this
provision of the Act, the statute refers specifically to §§ 1311, 1312 and 1316 (FWPCA §§
301, 302, 306) but omits any reference to § 1314 (FWPCA § 304).
17. 381 F. Supp. 553 (D.D.C. 1974).
18. Id. at 554.
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DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,19 however, held that EPA has the
authority to promulgate effluent limitations under section 301(b) and
that both guidelines and limitations must be reviewed in the court of
appeals.2" Based on statutory construction, the DuPont court found that
EPA promulgation of effluent limitations was implicit in the grant of
review in section 509(b). 21 This interpretation was supported by other
sections of the Act. For example the requirements of sections 301 (b) and
304(b) contemplate that EPA will issue the limitations, 22 and a contrary
conclusion would be inconsistent with EPA's permit review authority. 23
The DuPont court also felt that slight variations in language of different
sections of the Act should not be used to limit EPA powers24 and
expressed concern that allowing section 304(b) guidelines and section
301(b) limitations to be challenged in different courts "would create
duplicative litigation." Moreover, appeals from district court decisions
would hinder the Congressional goal of "prompt judicial review. 25
In CPC, the court dismissed the DuPont analysis as "unpersuasive"26
in view of the interrelationships between relevant provisions of the
FWPCA 27 and the legislative history.28 Since other sections of the
19. 383 F. Supp. 1244 (W.D. Va. 1974), aff'd, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975).
20. Id. at 1250.
21. Id. at 1252.
22. Id. at 1250-51.
23. Id. at 1252.
24. Id. at 1251-52. Agency action on effluent limitations and standards is variously
described as "promulgating," "approving," "establishment of" and "achievement of"
in FWPCA §§ 301, 302, 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316 (Supp. II, 1972).
25. 383 F. Supp. at 1254.
26. 515 F.2d at 1043 n. 19. EPA had argued that the same Agency findings supported the
guidelines authorized by § 304(b) and the effluent limitations mentioned in § 301(b). Brief
for Respondents at 12, CPC Int'l Inc. v. Train, 515 F.2d 1032 (8th Cir. 1975). EPA
maintained that such jointly supported issuance of regulations was consonant with the
language and legislative history of the Act and that judicial deference should be given to
this EPA determination. Id. at 15-31, citing Ehlert v. United States, 402 U.S. 99, 105
(1971); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); United States v. City of
Chicago, 400 U.S. 8, 10 (1970); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965). None of these
cases, however, involved an administrative construction that would affect the level of
original judicial review as in the CPC suit.
Finally, the EPA contended that such an interpretation would avoid "bifurcation of
review" and would "short circuit petitioner's attempt to delay pollution abatement."
Brief for Respondents, supra, at 23. For a discussion of judicial bifurcation see L. JAFFEE,
JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIvE ACTION, 158-59, 421-22 (1965).
27. See notes 30-32 and accompanying text infra.
28. 515 F.2d at 1039-42. The court also cited the Act's legislative history to demon-
strate that one of the purposes for setting deadlines on EPA promulgation of regulations is
to provide adequate and timely guidance for state National Pollution Elimination Dis-
charge System (NPDES) programs. Id.
[Vol. 12:267
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FWPCA actively mandate EPA promulgation of standards, 29 the court
decided that the passive voice of section 301(b) indicated that Congress
had given EPA no general power to issue regulations under that sec-
tion.30 The court went on to declare that "the permit provisions of the
Act are inconsistent with the argument that the permit-setting authority
is to be governed by regulations published under section 301. ' '3, In
Of particular significance to the CPC court was the understanding of the respective
federal and state roles under the Act expressed by two people most concerned with the Act
prior to its passage. Then EPA Administrator Ruckelshaus, testifying before a Senate
subcommittee, said:
We believe that such Federal guidance is especially important in the area of effluent
limitations. . . .It would be difficult and needlessly duplicative for each State to
gather all the scientific, industrial, and technological information upon which effluent
limitations must be based. Federal leadership must be provided here so that the
States, in setting effluent limitations, have a clear idea of the task.
Id. at 1039 (emphasis added), quoting Hearings on S. 75, S. 192, S. 280, S. 281, S. 523, S.
573, S. 601, S. 679, S. 927, S. 1011, S. 1012, S. 1013, S. 1014, S. lOlSandS. ol17before the
Subcomm. on Air and Water Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Public Works, 92d Cong.,
Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 19. The court also quoted Senator Muskie, a primary sponsor of the Act,
in his summary to the Senate of the Conference draft:
The Conference agreement provides that the Administrator may review any permit
issued pursuant to this Act as to its consistency with the guidelines and requirements
of the Act. Should the Administrator find that a permit is proposed which does not
conform to the guidelines issued under section 304 and other requirements of the Act,
he shall notify the State of his determination, and the permit cannot issue until the
Administrator determines that the necessary changes have been made to assure
compliance ...
515 F.2d at 1042 (emphasis supplied by the court), quoting LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 2, at 176. The court suggested that the comments of Mr. Ruckelshaus and Senator
Muskie would seem to be inappropriate if § 301(b) authorized EPA promulgation of
limitations itself instead of having them achieved through § 304(b) guidelines. 515 F.2d at
1042.
The American Paper Institute court did not refer to the Act's legislative history when it
discussed the interrelationship of §§ 301 and 304. 381 F. Supp. at 553. The DuPontcourt, in
contrast, discussed FWPCA's legislative history extensively, quoting in support of its
construction of the Act a different part of the Conference Report. "The Conferees intend
that the factors described in section 304(b) be considered only within classes or categories
of point sources and that such factors not be considered at the time of application of an
effluent limitation to an individual point source within such a category or class." 383 F.
Supp. at 1254-55 (emphasis added by the court), quotingLEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
2, at 172. In other words, factors relevant to establishing § 304 guidelines by EPA are not to
be applied when NPDES permits are issued or denied. CONFERENCE REPORTON S. 2770, S.
REP. No. 92-1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
29. 515 F.2d at 1038. See, e.g., FWPCA §§ 306(b)(1)(B), 307(a)(2), 307(b), 307(c), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1316(b)(1)(B), 1317(a)(2), 1317(b), 1317(c) (Supp. II, 1972).
30. 515 F.2d at 1038. See FWPCA § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b) (Supp. II, 1972). For
another example of the use of the passive voice see FWPCA § 301(e), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(e)
(Supp. II, 1972).
31. 515 F.2d at 1038. The court based this construction on the important enforcement
role given the states under the FWPCA § 402, 33 U.S.C. 1342 (Supp. II, 1972) (National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)). If states had to follow § 301 regula-
tions in issuing permits instead of § 304 guidelines, the court felt there was no logical
1976]
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addition, the court found it significant that the Effluent Standards and
Water Quality Information Advisory Committee (ESWQIAC) advises
the EPA on development of guidelines and standards only tinder sec-
tions 304, 306 and 307.32 The court also disposed of DuPont's policy
arguments saying that denial of court of appeals jurisdiction "is by no
means to denigrate the importance [of the guidelines] under the Act or to
diminish their clout in the permit-issuing process. ' 33 The CPC court
assumed that the guidelines are reviewable in the district courts.34
Under FWPCA the EPA is charged with eliminating water pollution
by 1985. 35 There is little doubt that Congress intended the states to play a
primary enforcement role under FWPCA. 36 The CPCcourt attempted to
coordinate these responsibilities by delineating the statutory scheme
whereby states issue permits according to EPA-promulgated guidelines
which may be reviewed only in district courts. This allows states
flexibility to meet varying local conditions which affect individual plant
effluent discharges-a flexibility lacking in present EPA administration
of the Act.37 In addition, challengers to section 304(b) guidelines are
assured that suit in a district court is proper 38 and that challenges need no
justification for having statutory one-year deadlines for EPA to issue those guidelines and
yet not having similar deadlines in § 301. 515 F.2d at 1039; see FWPCA §§ 301,304. 33
U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1314 (Supp. II, 1972).
32. 515 F.2d at 1039. FWPCA § 515, 33 U.S.C. § 1325 (Supp. II, 1972), requires the
Administrator to advise ESWQIAC of proposed standards and guidelines. The committee
may then hold public meetings on scientific and technical aspects of those proposals.
Whether or not it does hold meetings, the committee is required to transmit all relevant
information it has to the Administrator within 120 days after it has received notice of his
proposed regulations.
33. 515 F.2d at 1037. The court pointed to other sections of the Act that EPA could use
to enforce compliance with the guidelines other than through judicial review. Id. at 1037
n.l1.
34. Id. at 1038.
35. FWPCA § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (Supp. II, 1972).
36. Id. § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (Supp. II, 1972) provides: "It is the policy of the
Congress to recognize, preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of the
States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution .... See also id. § 402, 33 U.S.C. §
1342.
37. See generally Hearings on Implementation of the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Review of the House Comm. on Public
Works, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., at 27, 35, 54-63, 486-95 (1974) (particularly the testimony of
Walter A. Lyon, director of the Bureau of Water Quality Management, Pa. Dep't of
Environmental Resources and the discussion among John R. Quarles, Jr., Deputy
Administrator, EPA, and Representatives Wright and Cleveland). See also 6 ENVIRON.
MENT REP. 412-13 (1975).
38. The CPC court noted that petitioners had to file a protective petition in the court of
appeals while denying it had jurisdiction over guideline regulations. 515 F.2d at 1034 n.4. A
contrary decision by the CPC court would have eliminated uncertainty as to the proper
[Vol. 12:267
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longer be brought within ninety days.3 9
These very considerations, however, discredit the CPC court's read-
ing of congressional intent. Congress clearly intended that water pollu-
tion be tackled with immediacy by establishing time schedules for
pollution abatement' and mandatory deadlines for EPA promulga-
tions. 4' As a necessary adjunct of these strict deadlines, Congress
provided for swift and final review of EPA actions similar to that
adopted in the Clean Air Act.42 Because appeals through several judicial
levels may delay enforcement of challenged guidelines by over a year,43
court of review with the added benefit of enhancing national uniformity of effluent
limitations-another goal of the Act. See note 44 infra.
39. Only § 509(b) sets a 90-day limit on review. It has been suggested that this limited
time for federal court review may be unconstitutional under the fifth amendment because
of the possible lack of notice provided to potential plaintiffs, including citizen groups as
well as industrial challengers. Note, Reviewability: Statutory Limitations on the
Availability of Judicial Review, 1973 DUKE L.J. 253.
40. FWPCA § 301(b), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b) (Supp. II, 1972). Seenote 13 and accompany-
ing text supra.
41. EPA was under a court-ordered deadline of December 1, 1975, to belatedly comply
with the § 304(b) requirement that guideline regulations be issued by October 18, 1973.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Train, 6 E.R.C. 1033 (D.D.C. 1973).
42. FWPCA § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b)(Supp. II, 1972). The Clean Air Act's judicial
review section places all original jurisdiction of challenges to EPA-promulgated national
standards and regulations in the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Challenges
to Agency regulations having only local application are left to the appropriate circuit. 42
U.S.C. § 1857h-5 (Supp. II, 1972). The DuPont court noted the lack of legislative history
on the FWPCA's review provisions. 383 F. Supp. 1253-54 n.7 (W.D. Va. 1974). For a
discussion of relevant sections of both Acts see Note, Reviewability: Statutory Limita-
tions on the Availability of Judicial Review, supra note 39.
The fact that Congress included a provision calling on the Attorney General to assess the
feasibility of establishing an environmental court, Act of Oct. 18, 1972, Pub. L. 92-500, § 9,
86 Stat. 899, further supports the interpretation that swift review of EPA regulations under
FWPCA was intended. Advocates claim this new court would not only develop judicial
expertise on the complex technical problems involved in such litigation but would also
provide swift review of cases where the alleged harm to the environment is imminent and
potentially irreversible. See Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental
Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973); Whitney, The Case for Creating a
Special Environmental Court System-A Further Comment, 15 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33
(1973). The Attorney General recommended that such acourt not be established. DEP-TOF
JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, ACTING THROUGH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, ON THE
FEASIBILITY OF ESTABLISHING AN ENVIRONMENTAL COURT SYSTEM VII-1 (1973). See
generally Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 509,517-18 (1974); Rifkind, A Special Court forPatent Litigation ? The Danger
of a Specialized Judiciary, 37 A.B.A.J. 425 (1951).
43. 6 ENVIRONMENT REP. 196 (1975) (comments of Charles F. Lettow, attorney for
industry representatives). See letter from Russell E. Train, EPA Administrator, to Carl H.
Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives, Oct. 6, 1975, on file with the Urban Law
Annual, submitting proposed changes in FWPCA:
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the CPC decision provides a means to thwart compliance with the water
quality time schedules and thus delay FWPCA's overall goal.
Congress also intended that effluent limitations should have a
uniform impact on similar classes or categories of pollution sources. 44
As a result of the CPC decision, EPA will have to enforce section 304
guidelines in at least 92 district courts instead of eleven courts of
appeals. Courts of appeals, however, retain original jurisdiction over
By interposing the district court in the judicial review process, at least a one year
delay in the final resolution of a particular effluent guideline will occur because a
decision could be appealed to the court of appeals from a district court decision.
Further, since several challenges are pending in the courts, the validity of the
regulations involved might not be finally resolved until the middle of 1976 or later,
only one year preceding the deadline contained in the Act.
Potential delay was also recognized by the DuPont court:
It is reasonable to assume that by providing original judicial review in the Courts of
Appeals of effluent limitations under section 509(b) along with strict time limitations
and prohibitions on review by way of criminal or other civil proceedings, Congress
sought to establish expeditious and consistent application of limitations. . . . [Any
successful challenge to guidelines in the district court would affect the limitations
which could only be challenged in the Courts of Appeals and would thus hinder the
goal of prompt judicial review.
E.I. dePont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp. 1244, 1253-54 (W.D. Va. 1974). See
also Letter from Frank P. Grad to Anne K. Stich, Oct. 25, 1975, on file with the Urban
Law Annual: "The whole scheme of the law to my mind clearly indicates the congres-
sional intent that the Administrator be empowered to issue uniform effluent limitations
... .[Tihe reading the court has given [the Act] . . . results in disastrous delays in
getting on with the business of water pollution control."
44. FWPCA § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (Supp. II, 1972). The Conference Report on §
304(b) guidelines in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 2, at 172 states: "the intent is that
effluent limitations applicable to individual point sources within a given category or class
be as uniform as possible," cited in E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 383 F. Supp.
at 1255.
The DuPont court noted the difficulty with jurisdiction over § 304(b) guidelines in
district courts rather than courts of appeals: "[Bly plaintiff's construction of the Act,
actual effluent limitations would always be individualized for dischargers in NPDES
permits, thus limiting the broad precedential effect of any judicial decision approving or
rejecting any such limitation." 383 F. Supp. at 1253-54 (emphasis added). Administrator
Train also noted the lack of national uniformity in effluent limitation guidelines flowing
from the CPC decision:
It can also be expected that, unless the proposed bill is enacted, proliferation ofjurisdictions where review could be undertaken will increase the likelihood of
conflicting judicial orders with respect to the same regulation. Further, in the Courts
of Appeals, transfer to one court and consolidation of original challenges to a single
industry regulated [sic] are contemplated by 28 U.S.C. § 2112(a). On the other hand,
comparable consolidation in the district court could be accomplished only by estab-
lishing a multidistrict court. . . . Taking into consideration the number of district
courts that could be involved, such a procedure is unlikely to be implemented.
Furthermore, appeals from various district courts could be consolidated in one Court
of Appeals only if those district courts were located within the same circuit.
Letter from Russell E. Train, supra note 43. See also Note, Jurisdiction to Review Federal
Administrative Action: District Court or Court of Appeals, 88 HARV. L. REV. 980,983-85,
992-1000 (1975); Comment, Judicial Review and the 1972 Amendments to the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act: And Who Shall Guard the Guards?, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 770,
789-99, 808-09 (1973).
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similar effluent limitation regulations for new plants.45 This "bifurcation
of review"46 can only lead to duplicative litigation for EPA and indus-
trial challengers and destroy the uniformity of regulation contemplated
under the Act.
Ultimate resolution of the jurisdictional issue rests with Congress.
Only Congress can make the policy decision to hasten and unify judicial
review of federal water pollution control activities by providing original
jurisdiction in federal courts of appeal. 47 The urgency expressed by the
statutory deadlines sharply conflicts with an enforcement procedure
that can be delayed by multitudinous and lengthy court battles. If
Congress expects the deadlines to be met, it may have to amend either
FWPCA deadlines or the provisions for judicial review. 48 Although the
CPC decision may clarify the interrelation between several key provi-
sions of FWPCA, it does so at the expense of FWPCA's explicit goal of
clean water by 1985.
Anne K. Stich
45. FWPCA § 509(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1369(b) (Supp. II, 1972).
46. -Bifurcation of judicial review" was the phrase used in Foti v. Immigration &
Naturalization Serv., 375 U.S. 217, 226 (1963). The major issue in Foti was whether a
"final order of deportation" included a refusal to suspend deportation under the Immigra-
tion and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 5, § 244,66 Stat. 214. Final orders of deportation were
directly reviewable in the court of appeals. The Supreme Court held that review of the
administrative denial is ancillary to the deportability issue, and both determinations
should therefore be made by the same court at the same time. The case is discussed, along
with the subject of judicial bifurcation, in L. JAFFE, supra note 26, at 158-59, 421-22.
47. It should be noted that the CPCcourt declared that Congress has already made that
policy decision. 515 F.2d at 1037. But see American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 8
E.R.C. 1321, 1347-48 (3d Cir. 1975) (Adams, J., concurring) which criticizes the vague and
ambiguous statutory language in the FWPCA and concludes:
The definition of the roles of the state and national governments in areas where they
share concurrent powers is essentially a matter for Congress, not for the courts. The
failure to create clear boundaries for the authority of the states and the EPA has thrust
upon the courts a responsibility to infer legislative intent from the disparate provi-
sions of this complex legislation. The courts have not evaded their responsibility, but
our disagreement with the Eighth Circuit underlines the extent to which the courts can
write law, even in areas of Congressional authority, when there has been a failure to
manifest legislative intent by clear statutory commands.
(Footnotes omitted). The reference to the Eighth Circuit is specifically to its CPC
decision. For additional cases joining the Third Circuit in rejecting the CPC holding see
American Frozen Food Institute v. Train, 8 E.R.C. 1993 (D.C. Cir. 1976); American
Petrolem Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1343 (10th Cir. 1975); E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co.
v. Train, 528 F.2d 1136 (4th Cir. 1975); American Meat Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 42 (7th
Cir. 1975); American Iron & Steel Institute v. EPA, 526 F.2d 1027 (3d Cir. 1975); E.I.
duPont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 8 E.R.C. 1718 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 96 S.Ct. 1365
(1976); Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 415 F. Supp. 70 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
48. On Oct. 6, 1975, EPA submitted to the House for consideration a proposal to
amend the Act's judicial review section in order to make explicit court of appeals original
jurisdiction over the guidelines of § 304(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1314(b) (Supp. II, 1972). Letter
from Russell E. Train, supra note 43.
1976]
Washington University Open Scholarship
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol12/iss1/13
